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Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' to
promote equality in the workplace. Congress clearly intended the
Act to remedy intentional discrimination. The Act, however, re-
mains silent about whether it is also concerned with facially neutral
employment practices, adopted without a discriminatory motive,
that adversely affect the employment opportunities of racial minori-
ties and women. 2 The legislative history of Title VII, as originally
enacted, is inconclusive on this issue.
t Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). Title VII makes it unlawful for employ-
ers, labor unions, and employment agencies to discriminate in employment on the basis
of race, color, sex, religion, and national origin.
In addition to Title VII, Congress has enacted a number of other laws prohibiting
discrimination in employment. Among these laws are the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); the Equal Pay Act
of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982) (sex-based wage discrimination); the Vocational Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793-794 (1982) (handicap discrimination);
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (race discrimination).
For a broad-based discussion on Title VII that includes the views of sociologists, econ-
omists, law professors, historians and grass root activists, see conference entitled, 1984:
Twenty Years After The 1964 Civil Rights Act: What Needs to Be Done to Achieve the Civil Rights
Goals of the 1980 s?, reprinted in 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 665 (1985).
2. While the phrase, "it shall be an unlawful employment practice ... to discrimi-
nate," as used in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2), is deemed to embody our
national commitment to equality for racial minorities and women in the workplace, no-
where in the Act is a conception of equality or discrimination defined.
The debate over whether the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
supports both the equal treatment and equal achievement theories of equality was re-
solved in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court held that intentional or
purposeful discrimination is required to establish a violation of the equal protection
clause, thus limiting the Equal Protection Clause to equal treatment. Accord Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (a violation of the
equal protection clause requires a finding that a public employer made an employment
decision "because of" not "merely 'in spite of' its adverse effect upon an identifiable
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In 1971, in the landmark case of Griggs v. Duke Power,3 the
Supreme Court resolved the issue by holding that Title VII prohib-
its more than just intentional discrimination (or, disparate treat-
ment). The Griggs Court enunciated a second theory of
discrimination-"disparate impact" 4-a results-oriented conception
of workplace equality in which race and sex can be taken into ac-
count to remedy societal discrimination. 5 Under this theory, em-
ployment practices that do not intentionally discriminate but still
have an adverse effect on minorities and women can violate Title
VII. Griggs soon became the focus of an intense national debate
about whether a results-oriented conception of workplace equality
could (or should) coexist with the color- and sex-blind conception
of equality embodied in the disparate treatment theory.6
Eighteen years after Griggs, the Supreme Court revisited the ques-
tion and reached an opposite conclusion. In Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio,7 the Court held that the goal of Title VII is to remedy only
intentional discrimination.
group"). See generally Lawrence, The Id, Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that the courts have failed to recog-
nize the impact of unconscious racism in the decision making process). The Court
applied the same reasoning in holding that employment discrimination claims based on
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), need only be subject to the equal
treatment test. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania., 458 U.S. 375
(1982).
3. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
4. The Griggs disparate impact theory holds that facially neutral employment prac-
tices that have a substantial adverse effect on the employment opportunities of racial
minorities and women violate Title VII, unless justified by business necessity.
5. For a discussion of the Griggs disparate impact standard, see generally Belton, Title
IH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial Developments, 20
ST. Louis U.L.J. 225, 240-242 (1976); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972); Rodino,
Preface to Symposium on The First Decade of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Past Developments
and Future Trends, 20 ST. Louis U.LJ. 222 (1976).
6. The debate over the meaning of "equality" in the workplace is only a part, albeit
an important part, of the larger policy debate over our more general commitment to
rooting out the past and present effects of societal discrimination against racial minori-
ties and women. See, e.g., D. BELL, AND WE ARE NoT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST For
RACIAL EQUALITY (1987) (questioning, with the use of parables, this nation's commit-
ment to equality for Blacks); Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity
and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Michelman, The Meanings of
Legal Equality, 3 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 24 (1986) (survey of conceptual meanings of
equality); Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and The Elusive ieaning of Consti-
tutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1989); Thomas, Affirmative Action, Goals and Time-
tables: Too Tough? Not Tough Enough!, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y RE v. 402 (1987); Williams,
Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANCE 325 (1985). Compare Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 283 (1981) (attempting to prove a substantive notion of equality) with Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982) (arguing that equality has no substan-
tive content of its own).
7. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
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Underpinning Griggs and Wards Cove are two competing visions of
workplace equality. One, endorsed by Griggs, is the equal achieve-
ment theory. The equal achievement theory seeks to enhance the
economic status of racial minorities and women in the workplace;
this theory permits race- and sex-specific employment practices to
eliminate societal discrimination. The other vision, endorsed by
W Yards Cove, is the "equal treatment theory." Under this theory, em-
ployers may never consider race or sex in their decisionmaking 8
There is a fundamental policy difference between the approach to
workplace equality that the Court adopted in Griggs and the one it
used in Wards Cove. Griggs construed Title VII as congressional en-
dorsement of both the equal achievement and the equal treatment
goals. Wards Cove, on the other hand, construed Title VII as con-
gressional endorsement of only the equal treatment goal. Because
the Court in Wards Cove believed that Tide VII could not accommo-
date both goals, it dismantled Griggs's approach to Title VII. In so
doing, it attempted to end the era of affirmative action remedies
ushered in by the Court's construction of Title VII in Griggs.
The purpose of this article is fourfold. First, it will analyze the
Griggs approach to workplace equality under Tide VII and the inher-
ent tension in its view that Tide VII embodies both equal achieve-
ment and equal treatment goals. Second, it will review several of
the Court's affirmative action decisions to illustrate the tension in
the Griggs approach. Third, it will analyze the way in which the
Supreme Court in Wards Cove dismantled the Griggs approach to
workplace equality. It will conclude with a call for a "Third Recon-
struction" to achieve the workplace equality that Congress has now
made clear is Title VII's goal.
II. The Indeterminacy of Griggs on the Meaning of Equality
Under Title VII
Of the more than 100 employment discrimination cases decided
by the Supreme Court since the passage of Title VII in 1964, Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.9 has been the most important in eliminating em-
ployment discrimination. The Griggs vision of equality helped create
a workplace far more egalitarian than ever existed in the pre-Griggs
8. See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 262 (N.D. Tex.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984); Friedman, Redefining Equality,
Discrimination and Affirmative Action under Title I, The Access Principle, 65 TrEx. L. REV. 41,
54-57 (1986).
9. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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era.' 0 Nonetheless, by endorsing an equality theory that included
two different, and ostensibly conflicting, concepts of Title VII liabil-
ity-disparate impact and disparate treatment-Griggs planted the
seeds of its own demise in Wards Cove.
Before 1965, Duke Power openly discriminated against Blacks by
relegating them to the lowest paying and least desirable jobs. After
Congress passed Title VII, Duke Power abandoned intentional dis-
crimination, but the racial stratification ofjobs continued because of
the criteria the company used in hiring and promoting employees.
The company required applicants both to pass two professionally-
prepared aptitude tests and to have a high school diploma. Neither
criterion was shown to be significantly related to successful job per-
formance. In addition, a higher proportion of Blacks than Whites
failed the tests and a higher proportion of Blacks also lacked a high
school diploma. As a result, these requirements, although facially
neutral, substantially limited black employment opportunities.
The critical issue in Griggs was whether Duke Power had violated
Title VII because the effects of these policies limited employment
opportunities of Blacks even though it had not adopted those prac-
tices with the intent of discriminating against Blacks." The lower
courts had held that Title VII liability required a subjective intent to
discriminate. 12
A unanimous Supreme Court, however, rejected this position.' 3
Looking to the objective of Congress, the Court held that Title VII
"proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
10. See Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social progress and Subjective Judgements, 63 CH I.
KENr L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1987); Greene, Twenty Years of Civil Rights: How Fim A Foundation?,
37 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 719-730 (1985). See generally P. BURSTEIN, DiSCRIMINATION,
JOBS, AND POLITIcs, 125-154 (1985) (social science analysis of the impact of employment
discrimination legislation on various groups).
11. The Supreme Court specifically noted that Duke Power was not motivated by
racial discrimination in adopting the aptitude test and diploma requirements. ChiefJus-
tice Burger noted, "The Company's lack of discriminatory intent is suggested by special
efforts to help the undereducated employees through Company financing of two-thirds
the cost of tuition for high school training." 401 U.S. at 432.
12. 292 F. Supp. 243, 251 (M.D.N.C. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 420 F.2d 1225
(4th Cir. 1970), rev'd in part, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
13. In so doing, Griggs followed those lower courts that had liberally construed Title
VII. This liberal interpretation was most manifest in seniority and testing cases, in which
courts had principally applied the theory of "the present effects of past discrimination".
Establishing a violation of Title VII under this theory required a finding that the em-
ployer at some time had engaged in intentional discrimination that caused the present
racial or sexual stratification of its workforce. See e.g., Papermakers & Paperworkers Lo-
cal 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970);
Quarles v. Philip Morris, 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). See generally Cooper & Sobel,
Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of
Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1598 (1969).
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fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."' 4 The Court further
reasoned that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that op-
erate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups" I5 because "Con-
gress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation." 1 6
To address these "consequences" or effects, the Griggs Court
adopted the disparate impact theory. According to this theory, a
plaintiff can establish Title VII liability against an employer by prov-
ing that an employment practice, procedure, or test that is facially
neutral in fact disproportionately limits the employment opportuni-
ties of one group.' 7 The theory also permits, in appropriate circum-
stances, race- and sex-specific remedial measures to eliminate the
unequal effects of facially-neutral employment criteria.' 8
By articulating the effects-based disparate impact theory of dis-
crimination, Griggs embraced the equal achievement theory of equal-
ity. As the Court explained, "The objective of Congress in the
enactment of Title VII ... was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees." 19
Griggs recognized that such "barriers" would not disappear simply
by prohibiting intentional discrimination. Race and gender stratifi-
cation would continue as remnants of prior group discrimination in
the workplace and of the past and continuing effects of societal dis-
crimination. As a later case explained: "Griggs was rightly concerned
that childhood deficiencies in the education and background of mi-
nority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control, not be
allowed to work cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens
14. 401 U.S. at 431.
15. Id at 432.
16. Id. at 432.
17. Id. at 431. The Griggs disparate impact theory, in effect, delinked the intent and
effects elements, both of which "the present effects of past discrimination" theory re-
quired to establish a Title VII violation. See supra note 13. After Griggs, a finding that a
practice disproportionately limited the employment opportunities of racial minorities
and women was sufficient to establish a Title VII violation, provided the employer could
not justify the practice as a business necessity.
18. See, e.g., Ellis, l'ictim-Specific Remedies: A Myopic Approach to Discrimination, 13 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 575 (1984-85); Jones, The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970
Wisc. L. REV. 341; Schnapper, Varieties of Numerical Remedies, 39 STAN. L. REV. 851
(1987).
19. 401 U.S. at 429-30.
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for the remainder of their lives." 20 To counteract the impact of soci-
etal discrimination on the workforce, Griggs proscribed any practice,
procedure or test if it "operate[d] to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices. "21
Although Griggs focused on articulating the disparate impact the-
ory, it also implicitly recognized the continued existence of a second
strand of Title VII liability, disparate treatment. Unlike the dispa-
rate impact theory, disparate treatment requires a finding of inten-
tional discrimination-the plaintiff must prove that an employer
intentionally treated her differently because of race or sex.22 While
the Supreme Court did not develop the doctrinal foundations for
disparate treatment until after Griggs,23 the Griggs Court did hold
that the lower courts had not erred in adopting an analytic approach
to Title VII that focused on whether the company's test and diploma
requirements had intentionally discriminated against Blacks.2 4
The Griggs Court's decision to leave intact the lower courts' dispa-
rate treatment approach to workplace equality demonstrates its will-
ingness to apply a disparate treatment standard when employers
intentionally discriminated against minorities and women. None-
theless, the Court created the disparate impact standard to cover
those situations in which all employees-minorities, nonminorities,
and women-were evaluated by the same facially neutral criteria,
but where the effects of a practice systematically disadvantaged mi-
norities and women. For this situation, the Court, in effect, legiti-
mized color- and sex-specific remedies to correct the adverse effects
of the practice.
Endorsing both theories of discrimination, however, created a
theoretical and practical tension. While an equal achievement the-
ory of equality underlies disparate impact, a contradictory view of
equality underlies disparate treatment-equal treatment. These two
theories of equality and their doctrinal manifestations necessarily
20. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green" 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973). The reference to
"forces beyond" the control of racial minorities can only mean societal discrimination.
21. 401 U.S. at 430.
22. See e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802-4; Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (noting the substantive difference between the two
theories).
23. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792; Burdine, 450 U.S. 248. The Court clearly
stated that Title VII provides a remedy for both disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment discrimination in Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
24. 401 U.S. at 432.
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conflict because they have different objectives. The equal treat-
ment/disparate treatment model is process oriented; it aims to elimi-
nate race and sex from the employer's decision making process, and
thus to establish strict race and sex neutrality.25 Conversely, the
equal achievement/disparate impact model is results oriented; it
seeks to improve the economic position of minorities and women by
redistributing more desirable jobs to them. This requires employ-
ers to consider race and sex in their decisions. In addition, while
equal treatment paradigmatically focuses on individuals, equal
achievement focuses on groups-in particular their economic and
social status-and legitimates group-based relief.2 6 The tension be-
tween these two theories is inevitable because civil rights laws can-
not as a matter of policy-and employers cannot as a matter of
practice-simultaneously ignore and consider race and sex.
This tension was inherent in the reasoning of Griggs but went un-
recognized by the Court. Only once did the Court seem to acknowl-
edge it when it wrote:
Congress did not intend by Title VII... to guarantee a job to every
person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not com-
mand that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the
subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority
group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority,
is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed.2 7
By proscribing "discriminatory preferences for any group, minority
or majority," the Court seemingly reneged on the equal achieve-
ment theory's emphasis on race- and sex-specific remedies for
25. The rationale the Court used in Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702 (1978), is illustrative of the equal treatment theory. The employer in Man-
hart had adopted a policy under which female employees were required to make larger
contributions to a pension fund than male employees, even though, upon retirement,
similarly-situated females and males received the same amount in the retirement payout.
The employer justified the policy on the ground that women, as a group, live longer
than men, as a group. In holding that the policy violated Title VII, the Court reasoned
that Title VII "precludes treatment of individuals as simply components of a racial, reli-
gious, sexual, or national class .... Even a true generalization about the class is an
insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not
apply." Id. at 708.
The meritocracy principle rather than race or sex, is the goal of the equal treatment
theory. For a discussion of the merit principle within the context of the equality debate,
see Fallon, To Each According to his Ability, From None According to his Race: The Concept of
Merit in the Law of Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U.L. REV. 815 (1980).
26. For a comprehensive treatment of the differences and tensions between the two
theories, see Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Effects Standard of Liability in Title 1II
Litigation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 555 (1985); Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U.
CM. L. REV. 235 (1971); Friedman, supra note 8; Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equal-
ity Under Title 1I,7: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31
UCLA L. REV. 305, 365 (1983).
27. 401 U.S. at 430-31.
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groups that had been victimized by societal discrimination. Instead,
it appeared to endorse the vision of workplace equality of the equal
treatment theory. The Griggs Court, however, did not resolve this
contradiction between results- and process-oriented policies.
Griggs triggered a national debate over whether Title VII was
founded only on disparate treatment theory or whether it also em-
braced the disparate impact theory.28 If the two theories were irrec-
oncilable because one endorsed race and sex neutrality and the
other endorsed race and sex consciousness, then the Court should
have decided which of the two theories of discrimination was, in
fact, the objective of Title VII. If disparate impact and disparate
treatment were alternative approaches to the goals of equality, the
Court should have specified whether they could apply to the same
fact pattern. If they could not, the issue still remained as to the cir-
cumstances under which each applied. Answering these questions
was critical to resolving the tension in Griggs.
The Court, however, sent out mixed signals on these important
issues. For example, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,29 the semi-
nal case in which the Court began to develop an analytic scheme for
evaluating disparate treatment claims, the Court strongly suggested
that the two theories were not alternative ways to evaluate a claim of
discrimination under Title VII. While the Court of Appeals had ap-
plied the Griggs disparate impact theory to establish liability,3 0 the
Supreme Court rejected the application of the disparate impact the-
ory to the facts at hand. The sole issue, it held, was whether the
employer intentionally discriminated against the individual
plaintiff.3 '
In a 1977 case, Teamsters v. United States, however, the Court ex-
plicitly stated that either theory may be applied to a particular set of
facts.3 2 But one year later, in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,3 3 the
Court changed course again. The Furnco plaintiffs had sought relief
under both Title VII theories. The Court, however, analyzed the
28. See, e.g., Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems and Origin of the Adverse
Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL.
LJ. 429 (1985)(arguing that the impact theory is not supported by legislative history of
Title VII and should be discarded); Belton, Discrimination and Afirmative Action: An Analysis
of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REv. 531 (1981)(arguing in support
of the Griggs disparate impact theory); Blumrosen, Griggs Was Correctly Decided-A Response
to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 433 (1986).
29. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
30. Id. at 805-06.
31. Id. at 806.
32. 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
33. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
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claim under only the disparate treatment theory, without addressing
the disparate impact claim. Writing for the majority, (now Chief
Justice) Rehnquist strongly endorsed the view that the two theories
were not alternative analytic schemes, but that necessarily a choice
had to be made in any given case.3 4 Justice Marshall issued a sepa-
rate concurrence specifically to disagree with Justice Rehnquist's as-
sumption that the plaintiffs were foreclosed, on remand, from
seeking relief under the disparate impact theory. 35 The mixed sig-
nals from these cases and the Court's persistent failure to provide
clear guidelines had a predictable result-continued conflict in the
lower courts on this issue. This conflict would continue to 1988,
eventually setting the stage for Wards Cove.
III. The Manifestation of the Indeterminate Legacy of Griggs in
Affirmative Action Cases
The Griggs disparate impact theory provided both the practical
and doctrinal foundations for race- and sex-specific affirmative ac-
tion plans. The issue of the legality of affirmative action plans in
turn reignited the debate over the meaning of equality in the work-
place and the two Title VII theories of discrimination endorsed in
Griggs.36
The Court developed different analytic schemes for the two theo-
ries based on causation,37 presumption, and burden-shifting doc-
trines.38 Disparate impact claims require plaintiffs first to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination, which establishes a legal pre-
sumption that the challenged practice violates Title VII. A prima
facie case is most often established through statistical evidence
showing that a challenged policy or practice adversely affects the
34. Id at 575 & n.7.
35. Id. at 584-85 (MarshalI, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
36. The vision of equality embraced in the Constitution and the legality of affirma-
tive action plans under the Constitution raised problems and issues similar to and differ-
ent from those posed in Title VII cases. The Court attempted to resolve the debate over
the Constitution's vision of equality in City of Richmond v.J. A. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706
(1989). Title VII, however, is the focus of this article. For a discussion of how successful
Croson was in addressing the constitutional vision of equality, see, Rosenfeld, supra note
6.
37. See Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235
(1988)(discussing the causal element in Title VII cases).
38. See Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of
ProceduralJustice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (198 1)(discussing the conflict over burden-shift-
ing rules in Title VII cases).
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employment opportunities of a racial minority group or of wo-
men.39 If the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, the employer
could avoid Title VII liability by proving that business necessity
mandated the practice and that no alternative practices would be
consistent with its business operation without the same adverse ef-
fect on racial minorities and women.40
Two of the most critical determinations that had to be made in the
disparate impact cases were the proper use of statistical evidence in
proving a prima facie case and the evidentiary showing required to
make out the business necessity defense. Prior to its 1987 and 1988
Terms, the Court devoted much judicial energy to the issue of statis-
tical evidence. 4 1 It had not, however, provided sufficient guidelines
on the evidentiary showing required for the business necessity de-
fense.42 It was generally agreed that a validation study provided the
most probative evidence of business necessity. 43 Validation, how-
ever, was commonly known to be difficult, costly, and time-
consuming.44
Accordingly, many employers sought alternative ways to reduce
the likelihood of a disparate impact suit. Primarily, they adopted
affirmative action plans, pursuant to which they expressly took race
or sex into account in hiring or promoting in order to substantially
39. The Court first sanctioned the use of statistical evidence in Title VII cases in
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), and Hazelwood v. United States, 433
U.S. 299 (1977).
40. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
41. See e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440 (1982); Hazelwood v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321 (1977); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See Shoben,
Probing the Discriminatory Effect of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis
Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1977).
42. See, Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1021 (1982) (courts split over business necessity defense because of no gui-
dance from the Supreme Court); Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for
Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REV. 376 (1981); Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to
Disparate Impact Analysis Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHi. L. REV. 911 (1979); Note,
Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No--Alternative Approach, 84
YALE L.J. 98 (1974).
43. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. 405; In 1978, the four principal federal
agencies responsible for the federal law prohibiting discrimination in employment
jointly adopted the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607 (1979). The Guidelines set out various methodologies for validating employee
selection criteria.
44. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2787 (1988) ("vali-
dating subjective selective criteria ... is impracticable"). It has been estimated that an
employer seeking to validate a single employee characteristic such as an arithmetic test
for mechanics could expect to incur validation costs ranging from $20,000 to $100,000.
Gwartney, Asher, Haworth & Haworth, Statistics, the Law and Title I: An Economist's View,
54 NOTRE DAME L. REV., 633, 643 (1979).
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reduce racial and sexual disparities in their workforce. 45 By reduc-
ing these disparities, it became more difficult for plaintiffs to use
statistical evidence to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination.46 If a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimi-
nation could not be shown, an employer would not be required to
justify a challenged employment practice as a business necessity.
The Court first addressed the legality of affirmative action plans
under Title VII in Steelworkers v. Weber.47 In Weber, a group of white
employees challenged an affirmative action plan the employer and
its union had jointly adopted in part to limit exposure to disparate
impact liability.48 The white employees claimed to be victims of dis-
parate treatment discrimination because the union and employer's
policy considered race in making selection decisions. To support
their claim, the plaintiffs relied upon Section 703(j) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which, in pertinent part, provides that nothing
in Title VII "shall be interpreted to require any employer . .. to
grant preferential treatment to any group because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin" because of an imbalance between
members of these groups in the employer's workforce and the rele-
vant labor market from which the employer draws its applicants and
employees.49
45. Note, Rethinking Weber: The Business Response to Affirmative Action, 102 HARV. L. REv.
658 (1989). Another avenue that employers pursued to avoid facing the business neces-
sity defense was to seek the assistance of the EEOC. The EEOC responded to the em-
ployers' request by endorsing the "bottom line" defense. The Supreme Court rejected
the "bottom line" defense in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). See infra text
accompanying notes 59-73.
46. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 211 (1979)(Blackmun, J., concur-
ring)("to the extent that Title VII liability is predicated on the 'disparate effect' of an
employer's past hiring practices, [a valid affirmative action] program makes it less likely
that such an effect could be demonstrated").
47. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
48. Id. at 210 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), Section 703(j), provides in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer
.. to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account
of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of
persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by an em-
ployer... in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or
other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other
area.
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In a 6-3 decision, the Weber Court upheld the affirmative action
plan.5 0 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, relied on a con-
struction of Title VII that supported the disparate impact theory
and its underlying goal of remedying the effects of societal discrimi-
nation. He wrote:
The [Title VII] prohibition against racial discrimination . . . must
therefore be read against the background of the legislative history...
and the historical context from which the Act arose. . . 51 Congress'
primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial discrimina-
tion in Title VII . . . was with 'the plight of the Negro in our
economy.' 5 2
.... It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's con-
cern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot
of those who had 'been excluded from the American dream for so
long' . . . constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary,
private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial
segregation and hierarchy.53
Justice Blackmun's separate concurrence addressed the practical
quandaries that employers faced:
The broad prohibition against discrimination places the employer and
the union on... a 'high tightrope without a net beneath them'.... If
Title VII is read literally, on the one hand they face liability for past
discrimination against blacks, and on the other they face liability to
whites for any voluntary preferences adopted to mitigate the effects of
prior discrimination against blacks.54
To mitigate this problem and to reduce the tension between the two
Title VII theories of discrimination, Justice Blackmun adopted an
"arguable violation" test for determining the legality of affirmative
action plans under Title VII. 55 The "arguable violation" approach
would legitimize only voluntary affirmative action plans that re-
sponded to probable past or continuing effects of discrimination in
the workforce or in society.
50. The Court framed the question as "whether Congress, in Title VlI ... left em-
ployers and unions in the private sector free to take... race-conscious steps to eliminate
racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories." 443 U.S. at 197.
51. Id- at 201.
52. Id. at 202 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 204 (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 209-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 209-217. The "arguable violation" test had been espoused by judge Wis-
dom who had dissented in the court of appeals decision.
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The dissent appropriated Blackmun's insights on the tension be-
tween the race-neutral language of Title VII56 and the disparate im-
pact theory to reject such affirmative action plans. Justice Rehnquist
and Chief Justice Burger construed the language of both Title VII
and Griggs as embracing only the equal treatment theory of equality,
and as incompatible with the race-conscious, results-oriented affirm-
ative action plans. Justice Rehnquist wrote that "[t]he operative sec-
tions of Title VII prohibit . . . discrimination in employment
simpliciter. . . . [It] prohibits a covered employer from considering
race when making an employment decision, whether the race be
black or white."57 With respect to Griggs, he wrote that:
We have never wavered in our understanding that Title VII 'prohibits
all racial discrimination in employment, without exception for any
group of particular employees.' In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., our first
occasion to interpret Title VII, a unanimous Court observed that
'[d]iscriminatory preference, for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed.'58
Weber produced one alignment of justices on the question of
whether Title VII's primary goal was fair processes for individuals
or equitable results for groups. The Brennan majority emphasized
equitable results; the Rehnquist minority was concerned simply with
fair treatment. In the later case of Connecticut v. Teal,59 however, the
camps switched positions. Teal addressed the legality of the "bot-
tom line" defense. The employer, in Teal, used a two-step selection
process. The first step involved an objective standard-a written ex-
amination; the second step involved subjective standards-past per-
formance, supervisors' recommendation and, in some instances,
seniority.60 Black employees who failed the test sued the employer
under the disparate impact theory. 61 The employer defended with
the "bottom line" defense, which holds that for a multi-criteria se-
lection process, if the employer can demonstrate that the entire se-
lection process does not produce disparate results, the employer is
56. See Title VII, Sections 703(a)(I) and (a)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), (2).
57. iM'ber, 443 U.S. at 220 (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
58. Id. at 220-2 1.
59. 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (citation omitted).
60. 457 U.S. at 443-444.
61. Slightly more than 54% of the black candidates, compared to more than 79% of
the white candidates, passed the written examination. Id. at 443, n.4. In the second step
of the promotion process, 22.9% of black candidates were promoted, as compared to
13.5% of the white candidates. Id at 444.
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not liable under Title VII, even if one of the selection criteria has a
disparate impact. 62
In a 5-4 decision, again authored by Justice Brennan,63 the
Supreme Court held that the "bottom line" was neither a defense to
a disparate impact claim nor a rebuttal to a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact.6 Although the majority applied the Griggs disparate im-
pact analysis, it based its reasoning in substantial part on the Court's
prior disparate treatment cases. 65 Justice Brennan argued that an
employer may not discriminate against some employees on the basis
of race merely because the employer treats other members of the
employees' group in a favorable manner.66 The reason, he ex-
plained, was that Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII - the same provi-
sion the Court relied on to establish the disparate impact theory in
Griggs67 -principally protects the individual employee, not the mi-
nority group as a whole.68 Brennan's emphasis on the employment
opportunities of individual employees parallels Rehnquist's ration-
ale in his dissent in Weber for rejecting affirmative action plans.
In his Teal dissent, Justice Powell69 advocated upholding the "bot-
tom line" defense. He asserted that by relying on disparate treat-
ment rationale in a disparate impact case, the majority would
conflate the two Title VII theories and confuse employment dis-
crimination litigation.70 Powell further argued that the majority's
analysis might force employers either to abandon employment test-
ing or to rely exclusively on expensive validation procedures, which
may or may not be upheld under the business necessity defense.7 1
The objective of the disparate impact theory, Powell reiterated, was
62. The "bottom line" theory was established by federal agencies that have the ma-
jor responsibility for administratively enforcing laws prohibiting discrimination. For the
developments leading to the adoption of the defense, see generally Blumrosen, The Bot-
tom Line in Equal Employment Guidelines: Administering a Polycentric Problem, 33 ADMIN. L.
REV. 323 (1981).
63. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
64. Teal, 457 U.S. at 442.
65. Three of the cases that the majority heavily relied upon- Furnco Constr. Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702 (1978), and Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)-were dis-
parate treatment cases.
66. Teal, 457 U.S. at 455.
67. Id. at 440-49 (a disparate impact claim reflects the language of section 703(a)(2)
and Congress's basic objective in enacting Title VII).
68. Brennan stated, "The principle focus of [section 703(a)(2)] is the protection of
the individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority group as a whole."
Id. at 453-54.
69. Justice Powell, who did not participate in Weber, was joined in Teal by ChiefJus-
tice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor.
70. Teal, 457 U.S. at 459.
71. Id. at 463.
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to remedy employment discrimination against groups, rather than
individuals. 72
IV Wards Cove's Dismantling of Griggs and the Endorsement of A
Single Theory of Equality
In 1988, the Supreme Court decided Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio73 and sought to resolve the debate over which theory of
workforce equality Title VII embraces. Although Wards Cove did not
expressly overrule the Griggs disparate impact theory, it established
doctrinal rules regarding statistical evidence, the business necessity
defense, causation, and burden-shifting rules, that left little doubt
that it intended to dismantle Griggs.
A. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust. The Precursor of the
Dismantling of Griggs.
Wards Cove's doctrinal roots stretch to Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
and Trust,74 a case the Court decided the previous Term. In Watson,
the Court granted certiorari to consider whether the disparate im-
pact theory applies to subjective criteria. The Watson plaintiff, a
black woman, alleged that she had been denied a promotion be-
cause of her race. Supervisors relied on subjective criteria to award
the position to a white woman instead.75 A unanimous Court held
that the disparate impact theory applies to subjective as well as ob-
jective selection criteria.76 To hold otherwise, the Court implied,
would nullify Griggs and its progeny, and encourage employers to
rely exclusively on subjective criteria in order to insulate their em-
ployment practices from the more rigorous scrutiny imposed by the
business necessity requirement. 77
This implication, however, is misleading. The plurality, in an
opinion written by Justice O'Connor, clearly intended to take "a
fresh and somewhat closer examination of the constraints that oper-
ate to keep [the Court's holding in Watson) within its proper
bounds."78 The plurality undertook this reassessment to address the
72. Id. at 458-59.
73. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
74. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
75. Apparently included in the factors that the supervisors used to make the decision
were ability to use common sense and to exercise good judgment, originality, ambition,
loyalty and tact. See id. at 2787.
76. Id. at 2787.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2788 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia.
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employer's argument that it would now have to adopt affirmative
action plans in order to avoid liability under the Griggs disparate im-
pact theory:79
Respondent contends that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case
of disparate impact through the use of bare statistics, and that the de-
fendant can rebut this statistical showing only by justifying the chal-
lenged practice in terms of'business necessity,' ... or 'job relatedness'
.... Respondent warns, however, that 'validating' subjective selection
criteria in this way is impracticable.... Because of these difficulties, we
are told, employers will find it impossible to eliminate subjective crite-
ria and impossibly expensive to defend such practices in litigation. Re-
spondent insists, and the United States agrees, that employers' only
alternative will be to adopt surreptitious quota systems in order to en-
sure that no plaintiff can establish a statistical prima facie case.80
Although the employer's argument was limited to subjective criteria,
it more broadly and directly attacked the Griggs disparate impact the-
ory and its doctrinal foundation for affirmative action. The em-
ployer argued, in effect, that Title VII endorses only the disparate
treatment theory.81
Finding great force in the employer's arguments,8 2 the Watson
plurality proceeded to rewrite the law on disparate impact analysis
by stripping it of its doctrinal underpinnings. First, the plurality
held that standing alone, bare statistical evidence of disparate im-
pact could no longer establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination. Now a plaintiff must isolate and identify the specific
79. Id. at 2786.
80. Id. at 2787 (citations omitted).
81. Similarly the Reagan administration espoused the argument that Title VII em-
braces only the equal treatment/disparate treatment theory of equality. In fact, Presi-
dent Reagan and his administration came to office committed to a policy of color- and
sex-blindness and so fundamentally opposed the Griggs disparate impact theory of equal-
ity. The Reagan Administration's position on the theory of equality has been explored
and debated extensively in the literature. See, Reynolds, The Reagan Administration and
Civil Rights: Winning the War Against Discrimination, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 1001; Reynolds,
Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995 (1984); Reynolds,
Justice Department Policies on Equal Employment and Affirmative Action, 35 N.Y.U. CONF. ON
LAB. 443 (1983). For other commentary on the Reagan Administration's position on
civil rights, see Bartholet, The Radical Nature of the Reagan Administration's Assault on Affirm-
ativeAction, 3 HARv. BLACKLE-TrER L.J. 37 (1986); Days, Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan
Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 309 (1984); Selig, The Reagan
Justice Department and Civil Rights: Professor Selig Responds to Assistant Attorney General Reyn-
olds, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 431.
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employment practices that allegedly create the statistical dispari-
ties.8 3 Second, a plaintiff must establish a causal relationship be-
tween these specific practices and the alleged harmful impact.8 4
Furthermore, the Court substantially lowered the defendant's evi-
dentiary burden.85 Finally, the Court departed from Griggs in sug-
gesting that "[fjactors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed
alternative selection devices" are relevant to a defense of business
necessity.8 6
The plurality's revision of the Griggs evidentiary and burden-shift-
ing rules was driven by its view that Title VII embraced only the
equal treatment/disparate treatment model of discrimination. 7
Under this view, any rule or doctrine that encourages preferential
treatment based on race or sex compromises equality.88 The plural-
ity based its decision on section 703(j)-the same section on which
the white plaintiffs in Weber relied; the plurality construed this sec-
tion as Congress's clear and unambiguous statement that Title VII
supports only the equal treatment theory of equality.8 9
However, the Watson plurality's construction ignored the Court's
interpretation of Section 7036) more than a decade earlier. In
Teamsters v. United States,90 the Court rejected an employer's argu-
ment that Section 703(j)'s reference to preferential treatment pre-
cluded a group-based analysis based on statistical evidence.
Teamsters held that statistical evidence showing gross racial or gen-
der disparities in the employer's workforce was significant because it
83. Id at 2788.
84. Id at 2788-89.
85. Id at 2790 ("Although we have said (in Griggs] that an employer has the 'burden
of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employ-
ment in question,'.., such a formulation should not be interpreted as implying that the
ultimate burden of proof can be shifted to the defendant.").
86. Id. at 2790. But see Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 717 (1978) (specifically noting that Congress had rejected cost as a defense to a
claim of discrimination under Title VII). For a critical assessment of the Watson guide-
lines, see Mertens, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust: Unanswered Questions, 14 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 163 (1988).
87. Id. at 2791 ("high standards of proof in disparate impact cases are sufficient in
our view to avoid giving employers incentives to modify any normal and legitimate prac-
tices by introducing quotas or preferential treatment").
88. 108 S. Ct. at 2778 ("Preferential treatment and use of quotas by public employ-
ers subject to Title VII can violate the Constitution,... and it has long been recognized
that legal rules leaving any class of employers with 'little choice' but to adopt such meas-
ures would be 'far from the intent of Title VII.' ")(citations omitted).
89. Id. ("Congress has clearly and emphatically declared that the enactment of Title
VII is not to be construed to give employers an incentive to engage in preferential treat-
ment on the basis of race or s.x").
90. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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was often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination.9' Although
Teamsters was a class action disparate treatment case, the reasoning
of the Court was aligned with the group-oriented, equal achieve-
ment vision of Griggs. The Watson plurality, ignoring this precedent,
began to dismantle the Griggs/Teamsters model and replace it with
the individualized equal treatment/disparate treatment scheme.
B. Wards Cove: Griggs Disparate Impact Theory Dismantled.
The efforts to dismantle Griggs culminated in Wards Cove. Plaintiffs
in Wards Cove, a group of Samoans, Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, and
Alaskan Natives, 92 brought a Title VII disparate impact claim
against an Alaskan salmon cannery. They challenged a range of ob-
jective and subjective employment criteria.93 The Court granted
certiorari in Wards Cove to resolve some of the issues concerning the
proper application of the disparate impact theory that the Court had
been unable to resolve in Watson.94 A five-justice majority, with Jus-
tice Kennedy now participating, did what the Court had been unable
to do the previous year in Watson: it dismantled the Griggs disparate
impact theory by adopting the plurality's position in Watson and clar-
ifying its underlying vision of workplace equality under Title VII.
The Wards Cove Court, elaborating on the Watson plurality, greatly
increased the employee's burden to establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact and greatly reduced the employer's burden to de-
fend its practices. The Court agreed with Watson that in order to
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must now isolate and prove
which specific employment practices caused the statistical dispar-
ity.95 The Court further held that plaintiff's showing of disparity at
the "bottom line" was insufficient to establish a prima facie case.96
If the plaintiff carries its prima facie burden, the Court agreed
with Watson that the employer can rebut the plaintiff's case without
91. Id. at 339 n.20.
92. 109 S. Ct. at 2127 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Justice Stevens described the circumstances at the employer's business as
"bear[ing] an unsettling resemblance to aspects of a plantation economy[,]" by noting
the segregated housing and dining facilities, and the racial and ethnic stratification of
jobs. Id. at 2127 n.4.
94. Id. at 2121. The difference in the composition of the Court at the time it decided
Wards Cove and its earlier decision in Watson was the presence of Justice Kennedy, who
had not participated in Watson.
95. Id. at 2124.
96. Id. at 2124-25. Apparently the Court thought it only fair to apply the same rule
on "bottom line" statistics to a plaintiff, as it has adopted for defendants in Connecticut
v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
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proving that the practice was mandated by business necessity. In-
stead, the employer only has to provide a "legitimate business justi-
fication" for the practice.97 In addition, cost saving could now be a
relevant consideration."8 Finally, the Court imposed on the em-
ployer only the burden of producing evidence of the legitimacy of
the practice-not the more demanding burden of persuasion typical
of the earlier disparate impact cases. 99
The Court now placed on the plaintiffs the burden of persuading
the trier of fact that the employer could have adopted alternative
practices that served a legitimate business purpose, but did not ad-
versely affect racial minorities and women.' 00 In prior decisions, the
employer-not the plaintiff-seemed to have the burden of persua-
sion on the lack of alternative practices.' 0 '
As the discussion below will illustrate, the Court's new conserva-
tive majority in Wards Cove redefined disparate impact and analyti-
cally and substantively conflated it with disparate treatment. The
substantive change is most visible in O'Connor's plurality opinion in
Vatson that explicitly incorporated the intent requirement into the
disparate impact theory. The analytic changes described above had
the practical effect of grafting onto disparate impact the disparate
treatment framework for establishing Title VII liability. Through
these changes, the Court effectively dismantled the Griggs disparate
impact theory and endorsed a conception of equality that embraces
only a single theory: equal treatment as reflected in the Title VII
disparate treatment theory.
1. The substantive strand: only intentional discrimination is prohibited
under Title VII. It is well settled that Title VII disparate treatment
theory prohibits only intentional discrimination, 0 2 as do employ-
ment discrimination claims brought under the equal protection
clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.103 For
example, Justice O'Connor in a separate concurrence in Price
97. Id. at 2126 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977)).
98. Id. at 2127 (citing Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790 (plurality opinion)).
99. Id. at 2126 ("We acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions could be read as
suggesting otherwise.") (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 2126-2127.
101. Id. at 2126.
102. See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15.
103. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989); General Bldg. Con-
tractors Assoc. v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982)(Section 1981, like the equal protection
clause, can be violated only by purposeful discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976)(equal protection clause).
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Waterhouse v. Hopkins 10 4 clearly took the position that the theory of
discrimination in Title VII disparate treatment claims is substan-
tively the same as claims based on the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. 05 In Watson, she went one step further and concluded
that intentional or purposeful discrimination is likewise required in
Title VII disparate impact claims. It is important to understand this
conclusion because it is at the heart of the analytic revisions in the
Watson plurality's opinion that the Wards Cove majority explicitly
adopted.
Although Watson ostensibly focused on the need for a "fresh and
somewhat closer examination" of the evidentiary guidelines to be
applied in the subjective disparate impact claims,10 6 Justice
O'Connor ultimately concluded that the Watson evidentiary and bur-
den-shifting rules were designed to determine whether, in a dispa-
rate impact claim, the "challenged practice has operated as the
functional equivalent of a pretext for discriminatory treatment."1o7 Here, the
description of the disparate impact theory as the functional
equivalent of "pretext" is highly significant, for "pretext," in Title
VII jurisprudence, is simply another label for intentional
discrimination. 108
It seems clear thatJustice O'Connor intended to equate disparate
impact with disparate treatment. In fact, in Watson she clearly
spelled out her view that Griggs required a showing of intentional
discrimination. Most significantly, she argued that "[t]he distin-
guishing features of the factual issues that typically dominate in dis-
parate impact cases do not imply that the ultimate legal issue is
different than in cases where disparate treatment analysis is
used."' 0 9 Second, she argued that "the necessary premise of the dis-
parate impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted
without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be
functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination."" 10 Third, she
found it significant that in Griggs itself, "the employer had a history
of overt discrimination that predated the enactment" of Title VII." I
Finally, she concluded that in both the objective and subjective dis-
parate impact claims, "a facially neutral practice, adopted without
104. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1799-1800 (1989).
105. Id. at 1799 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
106. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2788 (1988).
107. Id. at 2790 (emphasis added).
108. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)(clarify-
ing analysis for disparate treatment cases).
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discriminatory intent, may have effects that are indistinguishable
from intentionally discriminatory practices."112 Justice O'Connor
was primarily concerned about establishing evidentiary and burden-
shifting rules that do not compel employers to adopt preferential
treatment practices that specifically take race and sex into account.
This concern also guided the majority in Wards Cove and under-
scored its commitment to disparate treatment alone."t 3
2. The analytic strand: the same analytic framework applies to dispa-
rate impact and disparate treatment claims. The decision of the Court in
Wards Cove to apply the practically equivalent analytic scheme to dis-
parate impact that the Court has applied to disparate treatment
claims completed the process of dismantling the disparate impact
theory of Griggs-and moved the Court toward a single theory of
equality under Title VII. Prior to Watson and Wards Cove, the Court
had made clear that separate schemes of presumptions of proof and
burden-shifting doctrines applied to disparate impact and disparate
treatment claims. The analytic scheme for disparate treatment
claims first required a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case." 4 The
burden then shifted to the defendant to articulate a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason to rebut the presumption of intentional dis-
crimination. The burden imposed upon the defendant, under the
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason defense, was the burden of
production of evidence, rather than the more rigorous burden of
persuasion. If defendant carried its burden, then the ultimate bur-
den shifted back to the plaintiff to convince the trial court by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that she was a victim of intentional
discrimination. 1"5
Wards Cove changed the disparate impact analytic scheme to ap-
proximate that of disparate treatment. After Wards Cove, plaintiffs
112. Id at 2786.
113. It has been clear, at least since Weber, that ChiefJustice Rehnquist viewed Title
VII as embracing only the equal treatment theory of equality.
114. As a general rule, plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case by showing member-
ship in a protected class, application and qualification for a vacancy which the employer
was seeking to fill, rejection, and the employer continuing to seek persons with the
plaintiff's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Mc-
Donnell Douglas was a failure to hire case, but the courts have appropriately adjusted the
basic approach for cases involving, for example, failure to promote or discharge. See,
e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)(failure to pro-
mote); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)(discharge).
115. Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Burdine
resolved a conflict in the lower courts on the issue whether the burden of production of
evidence or burden of persuasion is imposed on employers on the legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason defense.
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still have the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact. But Wards Cove reduced the defendant's burden of
proof in defending against a disparate impact claim. First, the Court
redefined the defendant's rebuttal obligation from the more rigor-
ous business necessity defense to a less rigorous legitimate business
justification defense. The courts must now review the legitimate
business justification defense under a "reasoned review"' "1 6 stan-
dard rather than the Griggs "business necessity" standard." 17 In ad-
dition, defendants need only satisfy the burden of production of
evidence standard rather than, as before, the burden of persuasion
standard. Therefore, the defendant's burden in a disparate impact
case is now analogous to the burden on the defendant in a disparate
treatment case to "articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
son". Finally, Wards Cove's holding that plaintiffs have the burden of
persuasion on alternative practices is comparable to the plaintiff's
opportunity to prove pretext in a disparate treatment case. Coupled
with the heightened burdens in establishing a prima facie case,
Wards Cove makes clear that the ultimate burden always remains with
the plaintiff in a disparate impact case as it does in a disparate treat-
ment case.
In fact, the Wards Cove analytic scheme for establishing disparate
impact might be more onerous on the plaintiff than the disparate
treatment scheme is. The Court has recognized that the rules for
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment are not oner-
ous;118 however, Wards Cove adopts very rigorous rules for using sta-
tistical evidence to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination. In addition, the Court now requires the plaintiffs to
carry the burden on alternative practices. This high threshold is un-
derscored by the Court's willingness to place a light burden on the
defendant to justify its employment practices." 9
V. The Future of Title VII After Wards Cove: The Need for a Third
Reconstruction
By adopting only an intent-based theory of discrimination, Wards
Cove effectively holds that the goal of Title VII is not to remedy the
116. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 ("The touchstone. . . is a reasoned review of
the employer's justification for his use of the challenged practice.").
117. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 ("The touchstone is business necessity. If an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude [Blacks] cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.").
118. Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
119. Wards Cove, 108 S. Ct. at 2127.
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present and continuing effects of societal discrimination against ra-
cial minorities and women. Nonetheless, the effects of societal dis-
crimination continue to manifest themselves both in the public and
private employment sectors. 120 Therefore, the future of Title VII in
eradicating workforce discrimination depends in substantial part on
eliminating the Wards Cove decision from our employment discrimi-
nation law jurisprudence.
Any attempt to remedy the present and continuing effects of soci-
etal discrimination and to repudiate Wards Cove must be predicated
upon an historical understanding of previous congressional efforts
to remedy discrimination against racial minorities. This history, in
turn, helps decode the implicit message of Wards Cove (and the other
civil rights decisions of the Supreme Court during its 1988
Terml 21), and offers valuable insights to guide any political, legisla-
tive, social, or economic proposals regarding the future of Title VII
jurisprudence.
120. Even the conservative majority of the Supreme Court recognizes the continuing
effects of societal discrimination. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706,
721 (1989)("we [do not view] 'racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon of the past'
or that 'government bodies need no longer preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial
injustices' "); Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2120-21 n.4 ("[o]f course, it is unfortunately
true that race discrimination exists in our country"); Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism:
The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673 (1985)(explaining that
both individual and institutional racism remain a prominent part of American life); See
generally Belier, Changes in the Sex Composition of U.S. Occupations, 1960-81, 20J. HUM RE-
SOURCES 235 (1985); See also, ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGE
FOR THE 1990's, REPORT OF THE CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS (R. Govan & W.
Taylor eds. 1989) [hereinafter ONE NATION]; Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DuKE LJ.
447 (1984); Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Idology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1497 (1983); Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REV. 828
(1983).
121. The other employment discrimination cases decided by the Court during its
1988 Term are: Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989)(white males who claimed that
they were victims of intentional discrimination because of race-specific remedial relief in
a court-approved affirmative action plan are not barred from collaterally attacking the
plan in a separate lawsuit, even though they had notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the court approved the plan); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363
(1989)(limiting the reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to remedy employment discrimination by
private employers by holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 extends only to the for-
mation and enforcement of an employment contract but not to other claims of discrimi-
nation that may arise from the conditions of employment); Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989)(barring under the statute of limitations period a
Title VII suit by female employees claiming sex discrimination on the basis of a seniority
system that the employer and union had adopted to give male employees a competitive
advantage over female employees); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775
(1989)(adopting the same decision defense in the liability phase of a Title VII mixed
motives case); Public Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854 (1989)(re-
jecting an age discrimination challenge to an employee benefit plan); Jett v. Dallas In-
dependent School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989)(employment discrimination claims
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A. A Brief Historical Perspective
Throughout its history, the United States has adopted several pol-
icy positions on the legal status of Blacks in the public and private
sectors.' 22 The first policy, grounded in the institution of slavery,
did not recognize Blacks as citizens.' 23 A policy of full citizenship
for Blacks embodied in the First Reconstruction ostensibly replaced
this nonrecognition. 24 The First Reconstruction consisted of three
constitutional amendments and five congressional statutes to foster
black political, social, and economic equality. 25
The adoption of the "separate but equal doctrine"'126 and the en-
actment of the black codes in the southern states repudiated the
First Reconstruction. 27 The Supreme Court's restrictive interpreta-
tions of the post-Civil War legislation played a significant role in
ending the First Reconstruction.1 28 Most damaging was the Court's
narrow construction of the "privileges and immunities" clause' 29
and its view that "state action" must be proven as an element of a
claim.' 30 The "state action" requirement became,' 3 ' and still re-
mains, a major impediment to the efficacy of the remaining post-
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against municipalities are subject to the rule that re-
quires a showing that the adverse employment decision was based upon an official pol-
icy).
City of Richmond v.J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), involved an equal protec-
tion challenge to a race-specific affirmative action plan designed to provide employment
opportunities to racial minorities and women in public construction contracts. The
Court stated, "We confront once again the tension between the fourteenth amend-
ment's guarantee of equal treatment to all citizens and the use of race-based measures to
ameliorate the effects of past discrimination on the opportunities enjoyed by members
of minority groups in our society." Id. at 712. The Court resolved the tension by hold-
ing that the concept of equality under the Constitution requires the application of a
strict scrutiny test to this context and that societal discrimination, standing alone, will
not justify the use of race-specific remedies.
122. Only recently have we taken steps to adopt laws to bring about meaningful
equality for women. See generally Karst, supra note 121.
123. This policy was established in U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2 (apportioning representa-
tion in the House of Representative on the basis of state population, counting slaves as
only three-fifths of a person).
124. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MicH. L. REV.
1323, 1323 (1952).
125. The basic building blocks for the First Reconstruction were the thirteenth,
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution, and statutory provisions that
Congress enacted pursuant to these amendments. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,1982, and
1983 (1982). See Gressman, supra note 124, at 1323.
126. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
127. See, e.g., C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OFJIM CROW (2d rev. ed. 1966).
128. See Gressman, supra note 124, at 1336-43.
129. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873).
130. See Virginia v. Reeves, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
131. See Gressman, supra note 124, at 1339-42.
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Civil War civil rights legislation to remedy acts of private
discrimination.13 2
The Supreme Court's rejection of the "separate but equal" doc-
trine in the 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of Education 133 helped
usher in the Second Reconstruction. 3 4 The Second Reconstruction
culminated in the enactment of Title VII as part of the omnibus
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3-5 the most comprehensive piece of legisla-
tion ever enacted by Congress to address societal racism and sex-
ism. Tide VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the favorable
construction that the courts generally gave to it, encouraged the
hope that the Second Reconstruction would eradicate both inten-
tional discriminatory conduct and the effects of societal discrimina-
tion against racial minorities and women.' 38
B. The Implicit Message of the Supreme Court: An End to the Second
Reconstruction
This historical perspective shows that the Court's 1988 Term civil
rights decisions constitute the second time that the Court has played
a pivotal role in halting promising developments in eliminating dis-
crimination. In fact, the Court's 1988 Term, and the implicit
message it conveys, suggests the end of the Second Reconstruc-
tion. 3 7 This message is that racial minorities and women should no
longer benefit from the most promising development that the Griggs
132. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982);Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972).
133. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
134. The term "Second Reconstruction" refers to the legal, political, social, and leg-
islative developments that took place between the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education deci-
sion and the enactment of the federal civil rights legislation in the 1960's. These
developments included the Court's rejection of the "separate but equal" doctrine in
Brown, the civil rights demonstrations in the 1960's, see REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVI-
SORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968), the nonviolent activities of Dr. Martin
Luther King, see D. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986), and the efforts of the civil rights
coalitions in pushing for civil rights legislation. See also M. MARABLE, RACE REFORM AND
REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-82 at 66, 168-99
(1982); Woodward, From the First Reconstruction to the Second, HARPER'S MAG., April 1965
at 127.
135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1982 and Supp. 1987). The legislative history
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is chronicled in C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST
DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHT ACT (1985).
136. See Belton, supra note 5; Norton, Equal Employment Law: Cisis in Interpretation-
Survival Against the Odds, 62 TUL. L. REV. 681 (1988).
137. See, e.g., Brodin, Reflections on the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Employment Dis-
crimination Decisions and the Abandonment of the Second Reconstruction, 31 B.C.L. REV. 1
(1989).
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disparate impact theory provided-the legitimation of race- and sex-
specific affirmative action remedies.
The implicit message in Wards Cove parallels the explicit message
of the justices who dismantled the civil rights legislation of the First
Reconstruction. A comparison of the Court's 1988 Civil Rights de-
cisions to the 1883 Civil Rights Cases1' 8 illuminates this historical par-
allel. At issue in the Civil Rights Cases was the scope of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875.139 The Civil Rights Act of 1875, described by
one historian as the "capstone of the congressional civil rights pro-
gram"1 40 of the First Reconstruction, sought to guarantee equality
for all citizens. Section 1 required that all persons be granted the
same accommodations and privileges to full enjoyment of inns, pub-
lic conveyances, and theaters. 41
The Supreme Court held in the Civil Rights Cases that the 1875 Act
did not apply to the conduct of private citizens who deny blacks ac-
cess to public accommodations. The Court explained:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he
takes the rank of mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of
the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected
in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected. 142
The Wards Cove conservative majority extended this reasoning of
the Civil Rights Cases, viewing disparate impact and its legitimation of
"preferential treatment"' 4 s and "quotas"' 144 as an undesirable rule
of law that treats racial minorities and women as "special favorite[s]
of the law". 145 It suggested that such favoritism is no longer appro-
priate or necessary and thus eliminated it by dismantling Griggs.
The majority believed that the disparate treatment theory must be
the "ordinary mode" or substantive standard by which all Title VII
claims of discrimination-whether brought by racial minorities or
138. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
139. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
140. Gressman, supra note 124, at 1334.
141. See id. at 1335. The provision parallels, in some respects, the public accommo-
dations provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a. Like
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, much of the post-Civil War statutory civil rights legislation
was designed to reach and remedy discrimination in the private sector.
142. 109 U.S. at 25.
143. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2788 (1988) (plurality
opinion).
144. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2122 (1989).
145. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
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majorities, men or women are evaluated.'46Justice Blackmun, in his
Wards Cove dissent, described the underlying premise of this posi-
tion: "One wonders whether the majority still believes that race dis-
crimination-or, more accurately, race discrimination against non-
whites-is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever
was."
147
C. The Need For a Third Reconstruction
The Griggs disparate impact theory was the most important doctri-
nal development in employment discrimination law.148 Studies on
affirmative action have documented its effectiveness in improving
the economic status of racial minorities and women.' 49 At the same
time, the business community has accepted affirmative action plans
as good business practice.150
Wards Cove will adversely affect the enforcement of Title VII in a
number of ways.' 5 ' It will make it more difficult for plaintiffs to pre-
vail in Title VII litigation because intentional discrimination is more
146. See also City of Richmond v.J. A. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721 (" 'CIt]he guarantee of
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something
else when applied to a person of another color.' ")(quoting University of California Re-
gents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-290 (1978)(Powell, J.)(plurality opinion)).
147. 109 S. Ct. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. The Griggs disparate impact theory has substantially influenced the develop-
ment of other areas of the law. See, e.g., R. SCHWEMM, HousING DISCRIMINATION LAw 59
(1983); Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 MINN. L.
REv. 1038 (1984); Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered" Ensuring Equal Oppor-
tunity Without Respect to Handicap under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 COR-
NELL L. REV. 401 (1984).
149. See, e.g., H. HAMMERMAN, A DECADE OF OPPORTUNITY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN
THE 1970s (The Potomac Institute 1984); Leonard, The Impact of Afirmative Action on Em-
ployment, 2J. LAB. EcoN. 439 (1984).
150. See Note, supra note 45. See also Jones, The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative
Action in Employment: Economic, Legal and Political Realities, 70 IowA L. REv. 901 (1985).
151. See Murphy, Supreme Court Review, 5 LAB. L. 679, 680 (1989)(the 1988 civil rights
decisions of the Supreme Court were "almost total defeat for minority employees, and
almost total victory for employers").
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difficult to prove.' 5 2 In addition, employers are also unlikely to un-
dertake voluntary affirmative action plans because they are not as-
sured of the net beneath the tightrope provided by Weber t53 and
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County. t54 Furthermore,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and other
federal agencies with enforcement authority may have to revise their
enforcement guidelines for the administration of employment dis-
crimination claims 155
Wards Cove also will reinstitute the case-by-case, individual-by-in-
dividual approach to eliminating discrimination that characterized
the pre-Title VII period, when the states' fair employment commis-
sions played a major role in employment discrimination suits.' 56
Historically, however, state fair employment commissions have been
largely ineffective because they pursued a rather myopic theory of
discrimination, identifying it as a moral problem not a legal
wrong.157
152. See, e.g., [Study by Yale law students showing impact of Wards Cove on pending
cases-referred to in Vol. 4, Labor Relations Week, p. 205, cited by William Coleman in
Senate Hearing on omnibus 1990 civil rights bill]; An Analysis by the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund On the Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, reprinted
in, PROMOTING MINORITIES & WOMEN: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR
THE 1990's (a BNA Special Report) (1990); Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining
Discrimination: The Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C.L. REV. 943 (1984); Welch,
Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than
Intent, 60 So. CAL. L. REV. 733 (1987). See also Burstein & Monaghan, Equal Employment
and the Mobilization of Law, 20 L. & Soc. REvIEW 355 (1986)(study showing that plaintiffs,
at the appellate level, prevail in about half of the Title VII cases; study, however, in-
cludes both disparate treatment and disparate impact cases).
153. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
154. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). Johnson applied the rule in Weber to a Title VII challenge
to an affirmative action plan voluntarily adopted by a public employer. Weber and Johnson
have not been overruled, but the doctrinal underpinnings for those decisions are now
questionable in light of Wards Cove.
155. Even before Wards Cove, the EEOC strongly advocated an approach to the en-
forcement of Title VII that was premised on the equal treatment theory of equality.
Thomas, supra note 6 (author was the EEOC's chairman at the time article was written).
For a study of the potential effect of Richmond v.1. A. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), on
affirmative action plans of many government employers, see NAY & JONES, EQUAL EM-
PLOYMENT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A PROFILE, WORKING PA-
PERS SERIES 4, Institute For Legal Studies (1989).
156. M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 20-
60 (1966). See generally L. KESSELMAN, THE SOCIAL POLITICS OF FEPC: A STUDY IN RE-
FORM PRESSURE MOVEMENTS (1948)(public policy study of the early reform movement to
deal with employment discrimination).
157. See Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 912-14 (1978); Hill, Twenty Years of State
Fair Employment Practices Commissions: A Critical Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO
L. REV. 22 (1964).
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A Third Reconstruction is now necessary to undo the devastating
effects of Wards Cove. This will require, among other efforts, legisla-
tive initiatives to overturn Wards Cove, a rethinking of the equality
principle by acknowledging differences in redefining the equity
norm, and a reconsideration of the role of the state courts in civil
rights enforcement efforts in the 1990s. These three ideas will be
briefly explored below.' 58
1. The legislative initiative. The Third Reconstruction neces-
sarily must involve efforts to convince Congress both to overturn
Wards Cove and to convey to the Court, through legislation, that the
Griggs disparate impact theory is consistent with the goal of Tide
VII. In fact, Congress must affirmatively reject the message of all
the Court's 1988 civil rights decisions.
Congress's intentions regarding Title VII's goals remain hotly
contested.15 9 Those who argue that Congress intended to adopt the
equal treatment theory focus on statements scattered throughout
the legislative history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 160 Those who
believe that Congress also included equal achievement as a goal
point both to the context in which Title VII was enacted and to Con-
gress's deliberations leading to the 1972 amendments to Title
158. Other suggestions on the future of Title VII include the recommendation that
the President direct federal agencies to make changes in their administrative enforce-
ment procedures only after notice and opportunity to be heard by the public; that the
government encourage cooperative validation of testing by police officers; and that fed-
eral agencies apply disparate impact analysis to cases involving disparate treatment dis-
crimination. Rose, Testing and Discrimination, in ONE NATION, supra note 120, at 168-171
(1989). See also Withers & Winston, Equal Employment Opportunity, id. at 190-214 (urges
forceful declaration by the President enforcing antidiscrimination law, a federal policy
on full employment; federal government to become a model employer; sufficient fund-
ing for vigorous enforcement of antidiscrimination laws by federal agencies). Professor
Clark has suggested that civil rights advocates should focus on remedies for plaintiffs
including legislation for "innocent victims" who are displaced by affirmative action
plans; legislation to give the EEOC cease and desist authority; liberalizing fees awarded
to successful Title VII plaintiffs; and the revival of direct social action, in the form of
economic boycotts. Clark, The Future Civil Rights Agenda: Speculation on Litigation, Legisla-
lion, and Organization, 38 CAm. U. L. REV. 795, 807-826 (1989).
159. Compare, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 10, at 14-16 (1987)(the legislative history is
inconclusive) with e.g., Gold, supra note 28 (the impact theory is not supported by legisla-
tive history, is unworkable because of employers' ability to formulate alternative selec-
tion procedures, and should be abandoned because it encourages employers to use
quotas).
160. For example, Senator Humphrey, a supporter of Title VII, defined "discrimi-
nate" as a "distinction in treatment given to different individuals because of their race,
religion or national origin." 110 Cong. Rec. 5864 (1964)(statement of Sen. Humphrey).
An Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII, provided to the Senate by Senators Clark
and Case, stated that "[t]o discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in
treatment or favor ..." 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964). Senator Muskie, also a supporter
of Title VII, stated that "[The Act] seeks to do nothing more than to lift the Negro from
the status of equality to one of equality of treatment." 110 Cong. Rec. 14,328 (1964).
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VII.161 At the time that Congress debated the 1972 amendments,1 62
the Supreme Court decided Griggs; both legislative houses were
aware of this and directly addressed the disparate impact theory.
The House also favorably referred to the decision.
The deliberations over the 1972 amendments supported the
proposition that, even if Congress had intended to adopt the equal
treatment theory of equality in 1964, it had a broader sense of dis-
crimination in 1972. Congress seemed to understand that an indi-
vidualized disparate treatment model was myopic given the
pervasive effects of discrimination against racial minorities and wo-
men, as manifested in "institutional practices" and the continuing
"effect" of societal discrimination. 6 3 The legislative history of the
1972 amendments seems to further support including the Griggs po-
sition into a construction of Title VII when it states:
In any area where the new law does not address itself, or in any areas
where a specific contrary intention is not indicated, it was assumed that
the present case law as developed by the courts would continue to gov-
ern the applicable construction of Title VII.164
161. Blumrosen, supra note 10, at 14-16 (1987); Helfand & Pemberton, The Continu-
ing Vitality of the Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 36 MERCER L. REV. 939, 948-54 (1985).
162. Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
163. H. R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess, at 8 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News, at 2143-44 (footnotes omitted), makes specific reference to
Griggs:
During the preparation and presentation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and distin-
guishable events, due, for the most part, to ill-will on the part of some identifiable
individual or organization .... Employment discrimination, as we know it today, is
a far more complex and pervasive phenomena. Experts familiar with the subject
generally describe the problem in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than sim-
ply intentional wrongs. The literature on the subject is replete with discussions of
the mechanics of seniority and lines of progression, perpetuation of the present
effects of earlier discriminatory practices through various institutional devices, and
testing and validation requirements. The forms and incidents of discrimination
which the [EEOC] is required to treat are increasingly complex. Particularly to the
untrained observer, their discriminatory nature may not appear obvious at first
glance. A recent striking example was provided by the [Court] in Griggs v. Duhe
Power Co. ... where the Court held that the use of employment tests as determina-
tive of an applicant's job qualification, even when nondiscriminatory and applied in
good faith by the employer .... was a violation of Title VII if such tests work a
discriminatory effect in hiring patterns and there is not showing of an overriding
business necessity for the use of such criteria.
See also S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
164. Section-By-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, accompanying The Equal Employ-
ment Act of 1972-Conference Report, 118 Cong. Rec. 7166 (1972), reprinted in EEOC,
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In the past, the Supreme Court has agreed that through the legis-
lative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, Congress en-
dorsed the Griggs disparate impact theory.' 65 In 1989, however, a
majority of the current Court seemingly sided with other commenta-
tors who argue that the reference to Griggs in the 1972 legislative
history is not dispositive on the issue of whether Congress endorsed
the disparate impact theory.' 66
To effectuate the Third Reconstruction, Congress must speak di-
rectly to the viability of the disparate impact theory. In the past,
Congress has repudiated Supreme Court employment decisions that
it concluded were inconsistent with the goals of Title VII. For ex-
ample, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Disability Amendment of
1978167 to overturn the Court's decision that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy is not sex discrimination. 168 In Section 274 of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,169 Congress over-
turned the restrictive construction that the Court gave to the term
"national origin" in Title VII. 17 0
In the same vein, both the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives have introduced legislation to overturn Wards Cove.' 7 ' To in-
crease the likelihood that these bills pass, political activity by racial
minorities and women, and coalition building will be critical, much
as they were in the early 1960's in helping to enact the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.172
165. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982)(citing S. Rep. No. 415,
92d Cong., at 5 (1971); H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., at 8 (1971)). See also Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-65 n.21 (1976); Motorola v. McLain,
484 F.2d 1339, 1344 (1973)(the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII
removed any doubts that Title VII was to be construed broadly).
166. See Gold, supra note 28.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), Subsec K. (1988).
168. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)(holding that a comprehensive
health plan excluding pregnancy from coverage is not sex discrimination under Title VII
because it makes a distinction between pregnant and nonpregnant persons).
169. Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 274B (1986).
170. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). See Note, Standards of Proof in
Section 274B of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1323
(1988)(discussing the debate between President Reagan and Congressman Frank on
whether Congress intended to adopt the disparate impact standard in the enforcement
of Section 274B).
171. See H.R. 400 and S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). These legislative efforts
would overturn the analytic underpinnings of Ward Cove, and redress other civil rights
decisions handed down by the Court during its 1988 Term. Neither of these proposed
bills would, however, address the heightened statistical standards adopted in Wards Cove.
See, Ralston, Court vs. Congress: Judicial Interpretation of The Civil Rights Acts and Congressional
Response, 8 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 205 (1990).
172. See Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REv. 907, 917 (1978).
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2. Reconceptualizing the "equality" concept. A fundamental con-
cept of the equal treatment theory is the notion of "likeness or simi-
larly situated." The theory holds that "similarly situated"
individuals, without regard to race or sex, should be treated the
same by some unstated normative standard. In fact, the unstated
normative standard by which the Court determines "likeness" has
predominantly been based on a white male norm.' 73 Whether the
norm by which the Court determines "similarly situated" should be
reconsidered is only now beginning to command attention in Title
VII case law and scholarship. 74 Professor Derrick A. Bell has also
questioned the "equality" concept's potential to bring about equal-
ity for racial minorities.175
The issue of the appropriate norm for testing the validity of "like-
ness," or "similarly situated" was addressed by the Court in a Title
VII pregnancy case, California Federal Saving and Loan Assoc. v.
Guerra. 176 The majority in Guerra was willing to redefine the norm-
based on the family obligations of women as well as men-in up-
holding a state law granting preferential treatment to women af-
fected by pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions. 177
The courts have also recognized that the intersection of race and
sex discrimination provides a basis for relief, under Title VII, for a
sub-class of black females, even in the absence of discrimination
against black men or white women.178
The question of whether a policy of equal treatment ought to be
the sole goal of our national policy against discrimination is one that
merits more serious debate. One projection is that almost two-
thirds of the entrants into the workforce between now and the year
2000 will be women-42% native white women, 13% native non-
white women, and 9% immigrants. White males will constitute only
173. The white male norm is implicit in Griggs: Title VII was designed to "remove
barriers that ... favor ... white employees over other employees." 424 U.S. at 429-30.
See also Bender, Sex Discrimination or Gender Inequality, 57 FORD. L. REV. 941 (1989).
174. See, e.g., Minow, Forward, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1986) (discuss-
ing how justice has been "engendered" by judicial commitment to giving equality mean-
ing for people once thought to be different).
175. D. BELL, supra note 6.
176. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
177. The law "allows women as well as men, to have families without losing their
jobs." Ia at. 289. The dissent, without specifically stating its norm for equality-which
was arguably based on the norm of maleness-would have struck down the law under
the equal treatment theory of equality. Id. at 297-304 (White, J., dissenting).
178. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987) (fol-
lowing Jeffries); Jeffries v. Harris Co. Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032
(5th Cir. 1980). See also, Note, Conceptualizing Black Women's Employment Experience, 98
YALE L.J. 1457, 1469-73 (1989).
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15% of the entrants.' 7 9 Based on these projections, we must begin
to reconceptualize the concept of equality from the one adopted
during an era of male breadwinners and female homemakers.18 0
The Wards Cove standard of equality is inadequate, as a matter of
policy, to facilitate institutional and structural changes to respond to
the changing face of the workforce.
3. State laws prohibiting employment discrimination. Historically,
civil rights advocates and litigants have preferred the federal courts
over state courts in the judicial enforcement of civil rights claims,
including claims brought under Title VII. That bias is not un-
founded. In fact, the First Reconstruction was partially prompted
by Congressional concern that state courts would not be sympa-
thetic to the enforcement of federal rights.' 8 ' A second reason for
the bias in favor of federal courts was the perceived notion that the
"quality of justice" in federal courts was substantially superior to
the "quality of justice" in state courts.'8 2 A third reason was the
concern among civil rights advocates that juries in state court pro-
ceedings would not be sympathetic to discrimination claims, partic-
ularly those of racial minorities.
Many state and local governments prohibit discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of race, sex, religion and national origin. 8 3
Title VII specifically preserves state laws prohibiting discrimination
in employment, except to the extent that state laws are inconsistent
with the federal law.' 8 4 Also, state courts are not bound by the the-
oretical, analytic and remedial schemes applied in the federal
179. See HUDSON INsTIUrTE, OPPORTUNITY 2000: CREATIVE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
STRATEGIES FOR A CHANGING WORKFORCE (1988); Firms address Workers' Cultural Variety,
Wall St.J., Feb. 10, 1989, at BI, col. I. See also Norton, The End of the Griggs Economy:
Doctrinal Adjustment for the New American Workplace, 8 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 197 (1990)
(arguing that scholars and legislators must also consider American's new service-based
economy when recreating Title VII doctrine).
180. OPPORTUNITY 2000, Id, at 7.
181. See Developments and the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133,
1135 (1977)(noting that after the Civil War, "[u]npopular or disadvantaged minorities,
unable to protect themselves when isolated within the processes of state and localities,
turned to the federal government and the federal courts with increasing frequency-and
increasing success.").
182. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977)(criticizing the
assumption that federal and state judiciaries are equally competent in enforcing federal
constitutional rights).
183. See 3 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 20,005-29,197 (collecting state and local
statutes); BNA, STATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAWS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION (1964). For a
discussion of problems and issues in pursuing state law claims in federal court under the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine, see Catania, State Employment Discrimination Remedies and Pen-
dent Jurisdiction Under Title VII: Access to Federal Courts, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 777 (1983).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982 & Supp. V. 1987). See also California Fed. Say. and
Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987)('itle VII's pregnancy disability amendment
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courts, 185 even though many state courts have endorsed the Title
VII theoretical and analytic schemes developed by the federal
courts. 186 Moreover, some states laws have statutory provisions
prohibiting discrimination in employment under the disparate im-
pact theory. In the past, some state courts have resisted efforts of
the Court to curtail federal employment discrimination statutes. 18 7
In the future, they may be willing to continue to endorse the pre-
Wards Cove jurisprudence on disparate impact.
VI. Conclusion
Title VII enforcement in the 1990s depends on reviving the Griggs
disparate impact theory or creating an equality policy not grounded
solely on an intent standard. It seems clear that the disparate treat-
ment theory, standing alone, will not remedy the continuing effects
of past societal discrimination against racial minorities and women.
It appears that, at least for the foreseeable future, legislative resur-
rection of the Griggs disparate impact theory is the most promising
first step in ushering in the Third Reconstruction.
does not preempt state pregnancy law requiring unpaid leave for pregnancy, childbirth
or related medical conditions). Section 706(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987), provides that when an employment discrimination claim arises
within a state having a state or local law prohibiting discrimination on the same grounds
as Title VII, the plaintiff may not file a charge with the EEOC for at least sixty days after
the commencement of state or local proceedings, or upon the termination of state or
local proceedings, whichever first occurs. The Court considered the relationship be-
tween federal and state employment discrimination laws in Kremer v. Chemical Con-
struction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
185. The sexual harassment cases are a good illustration of the difference between
state and federal remedies. Sexual harassment claims can be brought in federal court
under Title VII. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The remedies
for successful sexual harassment claims under state laws, however, can be substantially
broader than those remedies that are available under Title VII. For example although
punitive damages are allowed in state sexual harassment cases, they are not recoverable
in Title VII sexual harassment cases. See, e.g., Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214
Cal. App. 3d 590 (1989)(punitive damages allowed); Montgomery, Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 879 (1980)
(discussing common tort remedies); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F. 2d 301, 308-
310 (6th Cir. 1975) (no punitive damages for sexual harassment under Title VII).
186. See, e.g., Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. Travelers Ins. Co., 759 P. 2d 1358
(Colo. 1988); Saville v. Quaker Hill Place, 531 A. 2d 201 (Del. 1987); Georgia Bureau of
Investigation v. Heard, 166 Ga. App. 895 (1983); Lynn Teachers Union, Local 1037 v.
Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 406 Mass. 515 (1990); Wisc. Tel. Co. v. ILHR
Dept., 68 Wisc. 345 (1975). See also Friedman, Fair Employment Legislation in Louisiana: A
Critique of the 1983 Act and A Proposed Substitute Statute, 58 TUL. L. REV. 444 (1983)(discuss-
ing problems with Louisiana fair employment law). The Court has held that state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction in Title VII cases. See Yellow Freight Sys. v. Donnelly, 110
S. Ct. 1566 (1989).
187. See Arteton, Employment Discrimination Claims in State Court: A Laboratory for Experi-
mentation, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 499 (1985); Saperstein, Response, id. at 509
(detailing experience in California state courts in employment cases, generally).
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